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Comment
Central States v. Personnel, Inc.: When Real
Estate Investments Create Personal
Liability Under the Multiemployer Pension
Plan Amendments Act of 1980
Susan C. Glen
When intense competition forced Eugene Perrelle to close
the doors of his truck driver leasing company, Personnel, Inc.
("Personnel"), the corporation incurred a "withdrawal liability"1
of almost $300,000 for its share of the unfunded vested liabili-
ties 2 of the local Teamsters' pension plan.3 Pursuant to the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA7), 4 as
amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
of 1980 ("MPPAA"), 5 withdrawal liability attaches not only to
1. Withdrawal liability, a creation of the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act ("MPPAA"), is the amount an employer that participates in a
multiemployer pension plan must pay upon completely or partially withdraw-
ing from the plan. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1988). An employer may with-
draw from a plan by ceasing or decreasing contributions to the plan. See infra
note 24.
2. Federal law defines vested liabilities as "the present value of the imme-
diate or deferred benefits available at normal retirement age for participants
and their beneficiaries which are nonforfeitable." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(25) (1988).
A plan is underfunded for vested benefits if, on an actuarial basis, the value of
vested benefits exceeds the value of the plan's assets. U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, EFFECTS OF LIABILITIES ASSESSED EMPLOYERS
WmT-DRAWING FROM MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLANS 1 n.2 (March 14, 1985)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
3. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Pension Fund v. Personnel,
Inc., 974 F.2d 789, 791 (7th Cir. 1992). ERISA defines a "pension plan" as "any
plan, fund, or program... established or maintained by an employer or by an
employee organization, or by both... [that] provides retirement income to em-
ployees, or results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to
the termination of covered employment or beyond." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)
(1988).
4. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 and in scattered sections of titles 5, 18, 26, 31, and 42 U.S.C.)
5. Pub. L. No. 96-364,94 Stat. 1208 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of titles 26 and 29 U.S.C.). The citations in this Comment refer to sections
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the participating employer, but also jointly and severally to all
"trades or businesses" under "common control."6 According to
the Seventh Circuit, Perrelle operated two distinct businesses
under common control. Perrelle undeniably owned all of Person-
nel's stock.7 The Seventh Circuit declared that Perrelle also ac-
ted as a sole proprietor of a real estate business because he
owned and leased an apartment building at the time Personnel
withdrew from the pension plan and because he had sold and
leased properties over the previous three years.8 Thus, under
MPPAA's controlled group provisions, Perrelle's sole proprietor-
ship became jointly and severally liable, and Perrelle became
personally liable for Personnel's withdrawal obligation.9
As the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's potential li-
ability increases, 10 pension plan administrators will attempt to
protect workers by continuing to press for the broadest possible
interpretation of MPPAA's withdrawal liability provisions. The
Seventh Circuit's overly expansive interpretation of the term
"trades or businesses" in Central States v. Personnel, Inc.,"
which encompasses personal investments like Perrelle's real es-
tate activities, imposes an unexpected and unwarranted penalty
on individual employers of unionized labor.
This Comment addresses the extent to which MPPAA holds
owners of controlling interests in corporations personally liable
for their corporations' pension plan withdrawal obligations be-
cause they also maintain personal investments. Part I discusses
the problem of multiemployer pension plan underfunding, the
operation of withdrawal liability, and MPPAA's controlled group
provisions. Part II describes the Personnel decisions. Part III
analyzes under what circumstances MPPAA should deem own-
ership of real estate or other assets "trades or businesses" for
purposes of imposing withdrawal liability.
This Comment concludes that courts must better distin-
guish trades or businesses from assets, like Perrelle's real es-
of the United States Code rather than to the internal numbering of ERISA and
MPPAA.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (1988); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet,
630 F.2d 4, 11 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 914 (1981); see 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.414(c)-2 (1992) (defining "trades or businesses under common control").
7. Personnel, 974 F.2d at 791.
8. Id. at 794-96.
9. Id. at 795-96.
10. For an explanation of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's role,
see infra note 16. For a discussion of the PBGC's massive deficit, see GAO RF-
PORT, infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
11. 974 F.2d 789, 794-96 (7th Cir. 1992).
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tate, held primarily as investments. A narrower interpretation
of the term "trades or businesses" bolsters union workers' retire-
ment security by eliminating a disincentive for employers to par-
ticipate in multiemployer pension plans. It also enables
employers to maintain some personal investments, outside of
qualified plans, that are not subject to controlled group liability.
I. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM
MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLANS
Congress enacted ERISA to safeguard the "continued well-
being and security of millions of employees and their depen-
dents" covered by private pension plans.12 To accomplish this
goal, ERISA revised the federal tax allowances 13 for "quali-
fied"14 pension plans and created the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation ("PBGC"),15 a wholly-owned government corpora-
tion within the Department of Labor, to insure those plans.16
The PBGC currently insures the pensions of about 40 million
American workers.' 7
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988) (entitled "Congressional findings and declara-
tion of policy").
13. ERISA provides three main tax advantages: employer contributions
usually cannot be included in an employee's gross income until they are distrib-
uted, employer contributions usually can be deducted when paid, and contribu-
tions are held in a trust, the earnings of which are tax exempt. 2 BoRIs I.
BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFrs 61.1.1, at 61-3 to 61-4 (2d ed. 1989).
14. A qualified pension plan meets the requirements of I.R.C. § 401(a) and
the sections to which it refers. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (1988); BrrKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 13, 1 61.2, at 61-16 to 61-17; see generally id. 91 61.1.2; WILLIAm L.
SOLLEE & LARRY E. SHAPIRO, PENSION PLANS-QUALIFICATIONS (BNA Tax
Mgmt. Portfolio No. 351, 1992). Despite the wide usage of the term "qualified
plan," it is the trust formed to hold the pension plan, rather than the plan itself,
that is qualified. BrrnER & LONKEN, supra note 13, at 91 61.2, 61-16 to 61-17.
15. 29 U.S.C. 88 1301-1309 (1988) (establishing the PBGC).
16. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1988). The PBGC insures vested retire-
ment benefits for participants of covered plans that terminate with insufficient
funds to pay vested benefits. See id. For a definition of unfunded vested bene-
fits, see supra note 2. The Department of Labor enforces the funding provi-
sions, fiduciary standards, and other requirements of ERISA's title I. The
PBGC enforces funding obligations through its statutory power to terminate
plans. Daniel Keating, Chapter 11's New Ten-Ton Monster: The PBGC and
Bankruptcy, 77 MINN. L. REV. 803, 803 n.1 (1993) (citing Frank Cummings, La-
bor Relations and ERISA. Considerations in Corporate Change (Mergers, Ac-
quisitions, Bankruptcy), in ALI-ABA RESOURCE MATERIALS: LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAw 1787, 1812 (6th ed. 1992)).
17. David A. Vise, Dueling Actuaries: Icahn, Regulators at Odds Over
What He Owes to TWA's Retirement Funds, MINNEAPOLIS STAR & TRm., Oct. 28,
1992, at ID.
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Multiemployer pension plans include defined benefit and
defined contribution plans'8 maintained by two or more employ-
ers pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. 19 Tradition-
ally, employers have established these plans, organized by
industry or region or both,20 in industries for which single em-
ployer plans would be inadequate because of cyclical employ-
ment, repeated layoffs, or frequent business failures.21 The
PBGC estimates that in 1987 it insured the benefits of 8.2 mil-
lion workers participating in 2,300 multiemployer plans.22
The PBGC may pay plan benefits of up to only $2,352.27 per month (in
1992 dollars) per beneficiary even if the original pension plan promised higher
payments to the beneficiary. Keating, supra note 16, at 807; see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1322 (1988). Even so, about 85% of plan participants receive all benefits
promised after plan termination. Keating, supra note 16, at 807 (citing James
B. Lockhart, Securing the Pension Promise, 43 LAB. L.J. 195, 195 (1992)).
18. Defined benefit plans, the type involved in Personnel, provide workers
an annual pension, usually based on the employee's salary and years of service.
Keating, supra note 16, at 805; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1988). Most pension
plans are defined benefit plans. Keating, supra note 16, at 805-06 (citing James
G. Durfee, ERISA Overview, in PENSION AND WELFAR BENEFITs IN BANIC-
RuPTcY 33, 37 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
444, 1988)). Because defined benefit plans are funded over time, at any given
time the plan may have insufficient assets to pay all vested benefits. FRAuc
CUmMINGs & ALIcIA M. KERsHAw, MULTIEMPLOYER PLANs-SPEcIAL RULES, at
A-2 (BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolio No. 359-2d, 1986).
In defined contribution plans, the employer contributes a percentage of an
employee's income to an account, to which the employee is entitled upon retire-
ment. Keating, supra note 16, at 806; see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1988).
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(37)(A), 1301(a)(3) (1988). ERISA defines single em-
ployer plans as all defined benefit plans which are not multiemployer plans. 29
U.S.C. § 1301(b)(2) (1988). For plan qualification purposes, all members of a
controlled group of trades or businesses constitute one "employer." I.R.C.
§§ 413, 414(b)-(c) (1988). Thus, a pension plan maintained by two commonly
controlled businesses would not qualify as a multiemployer plan. See id.
20. CumMINGs & KERSHAw, supra note 18, at A-1.
21. J. Robert Suffoletta, Jr., Note, Who Should Pay When Federally In-
sured Pension Funds Go Broke?: A Strategy for Recovering from the Wrongdo-
ers, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 308, 311 n.18 (1990) (citing Multiemployer Pension
Plan Amendments Act of 1979: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways &
Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1980)) ("In industries of these kinds, workers
cannot obtain meaningful pension rights under a single-employer plan. Thus,
collectively bargained, multiemployer plans were developed to provide pensions
to workers in these highly volatile industries.").
22. Id. at 311 n.18. (citing PENSION BENEFIT GuAR. CORP., ANN. REP. 5
(1987)).
A primary advantage of multiemployer plans is portability of benefits.
CummiGs & KEnsHAw, supra note 18, at A-1. That is, employees can take their
benefits with them if they take jobs with other employers contributing to the
same pension plan or with employers contributing to other plans with reciproc-
ity agreements. Id.
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A. TERMNATION LiAiBI'Ty AND PLAN UNDERFuNDiNG
As originally enacted, ERISA imposed a termination liabil-
ity 23 of up to thirty percent of an employer's net worth on an
employer that withdrew, in whole or in part,24 from a multiem-
ployer pension plan insured by the PBGC if that plan termi-
nated within five years of the employer's withdrawal.25 If the
plan survived for five years or more, the withdrawing employer
incurred no liability and the withdrawing employer's share of
the plan's unfunded vested liability shifted to the employers still
participating in the plan.26 The shifting of a plan's unfunded
liability decreased the contribution base for the plan,27 thereby
23. Termination liability is the amount of a plan's unfimded vested bene-
fits for which an employer is liable when the pension plan to which the em-
ployer had contributed terminates. The liability also includes interest,
calculated at a reasonable rate, from the termination date. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1361-1371 (1988). In MPPAA, Congress replaced termination liability with
withdrawal liability for multiemployer plans. See infra notes 36-38 and accom-
panying text.
24. Withdrawal can be "complete" or "partial." 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988). A
complete withdrawal occurs when an employer permanently ceases to have an
obligation to contribute or permanently ceases covered operations (e.g., ceases
to be signatory to a collective bargaining agreement or goes out of business). 29
U.S.C. § 1383 (1988). A partial withdrawal occurs when an employer effects a
70% contribution decline or experiences a partial cessation of its obligation to
contribute. 29 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988). The usual partial withdrawal scenario oc-
curs because an employer has suffered a 70% or greater decline in contribution
base units (e.g., hours or tons) for three consecutive plan years. John R. Wood-
rum & Timothy B. McBride, Controlled Group Liability Under the Multiem-
ployer Pension Plan Amendments Act: Liability Without Limit?, 90 W. VA. L.
REv. 731, 731 n.3 (1988).
25. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray Co., 467 U.S. 717, 721
(1984).
26. See id.
27. See id. The Executive Director of the PBGC testified before Congress to
the adverse effect of employer withdrawal on multiemployer plans:
A key problem of ongoing multiemployer plans, especially in declining
industries, is the problem of employer withdrawal. Employer with-
drawals reduce a plan's contribution base. This pushes the contribu-
tion rate for remaining employers to higher and higher levels in order
to fund past service liabilities, including liabilities generated by em-
ployers no longer participating in the plan, so-called inherited liabili-
ties. The rising costs may encourage-or force-further withdrawals,
thereby increasing the inherited liabilities to be funded by an ever-de-
creasing contribution base. This vicious downward spiral may con-
tinue until it is no longer reasonable or possible for the pension plan to
continue.
Id. at 722 n.2 (quoting Pension Plan Termination Insurance Issues: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978) (statement of Matthew M. Lind)).
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creating a potential "race to the exit,"28 which contravened
ERISA's primary purpose: to protect the retirement income of
employees covered by private pensions.29
The incentive for premature plan termination created a risk
that multiemployer plans' funding deficiencies would fall on the
PBGC.30 This threat worried Congress because, during the
1970s and early 1980s, many pension plans under ERISA had
enormous withdrawal liabilities.3 ' Observers estimate that the
PBGC's negative net worth currently amounts to $2.5 billion
and forecast that, absent remedial measures, it will reach $18
28. See Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v.
Koder, 969 F.2d 451,452 (7th Cir. 1992); CUMMINGS & KERSHAW, supra note 18,
at A-1 ("[T]he fear of being among the few left in the final days of a declining
multiemployer plan may have caused a 'race to the exit'-generating a self-ful-
filling prophecy of plan decline."). Recall that, under the original ERISA provi-
sions, termination liability fell only on employers participating when the plan
terminated and on employers that withdrew within five years of plan termina-
tion. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. Gray Co., 467 U.S. 717, 721
(1984).
29. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
30. To fund the cost of insured benefits, the PBGC first looks to any assets
in the underfunded plan. Keating, supra note 16, at 807. It funds any shortfall
with its own monies, which are derived mainly from premiums charged to em-
ployers that maintain ongoing plans. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1306, 1344 (1988
& Supp. I1 1991)). The federal government incurs no liability for any of the
PBGC's obligations. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302(g)(2) (1988). ERISA, however, autho-
rizes the PBGC to borrow up to $100 million from the U.S. Treasury. Keating,
supra note 16, at 809 n.30; see 29 U.S.C. § 1305(c) (1988).
Public Law 95-214 mandated a 1978 study to analyze the PBGC's multiem-
ployer plan terminaiion insurance program. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 3
(citing Multiemployer Study Required by P.L. 95-214 (1978)). The report con-
cluded that 10% of the existing multiemployer plans, which covered 15% of all
participants, suffered financial problems that could lead to plan termination
within 10 years. Id. The report predicted that, to protect against potential
losses, the PBGC would need to increase annual insurance premiums for mul-
tiemployer plans from $0.50 to as much as $80 per participant. Id.
31. Woodrum & McBride, supra note 24, at 734 (citing Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray Co., 467 U.S. 717,721-22,730 (1984)). Under ERISA's
original plan funding rules, large withdrawal liabilities for certain multiem-
ployer plans were not uncommon. Id. at 732 n.10. For example, in the early
1980s, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) Pension Plans' unfunded
liability was so large that employers withdrawing in 1981 and 1982 sometimes
incurred withdrawal penalties that were considerably more than their cumula-
tive contributions. Id. The amount of withdrawal liability assessed will vary
substantially, however, depending on the interest rate used to calculate the
plan's unfunded vested benefits. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 24. Calcula-
tions based on a high interest rate produce a relatively low value of vested bene-
fits whereas calculations based on a low interest rate yield a relatively high
value for vested benefits. Id. Changing the interest rate assumption by as little




billion before the turn of the century.32 The relatively small
number of plans at risk of termination tend to be the most un-
derfunded on a termination basis.33 In particular, the PBGC
calculated that underfunded pension plans in the troubled steel,
airline, and automobile industries expose it to billions of dollars
in liability.34
B. MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN AAmNDmENTs ACT OF 1980:
THE GENEsIs OF WITHDRAwAL LIABILITY
Congress attempted to eliminate the incentive for employ-
ers to withdraw from multiemployer plans by enacting MP-
PAA.35 MPPAA subjects employers that exit multiemployer
32. Keating, supra note 16, at 809 (citing James B. Lockhart, Securing the
Pension Promise, 43 LAB. L.J. 195, 195-96 (1992)).
33. Id. at 813. The GAO estimated that 15.9% of nonconstruction industry
plans with 100 or more participants were less than 50% funded for vested bene-
fits. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 13. The study, which analyzed 1978 data,
conceded that it might have overestimated unfunded vested benefits because of
the GAO's conservative (i.e., low interest rate) actuarial assumptions. Id. at 14.
Nonetheless, it concluded that estimates of unfunded vested benefits based on
less conservative assumptions would still amount to billions of dollars. Id. at
vii.
34. Keating, supra note 16, at 813. "Of the fifty firms with the largest un-
derfunded pension plans, forty percent of the companies and seventy-five per-
cent of the underfunded amount are concentrated in the troubled steel,
automobile and airline industries." Id. at 813 (citing Ellin Rosenthal, PBGC
Releases 'Top 50' List, 50 TAX NoTEs 922, 923 (1991)). The PBGC estimates
that over half of these fifty are "either probable or possible losses." Id. at 813.
According to the executive director of the PBGC, the PBGO's exposure "could be
as high as $20 billion to $30 billion in the event of a major recession that in-
volved a downturn in the steel, automobile, and airline industries." Id. at 809
n.30 (citing Tighter Pension Insurance Rules Urged to Protect Benefits in Reor-
ganizations, 2 Bankr. L. Rep. (BNA) 328, 330 (Apr. 5, 1990)).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c)(2) (1988) ("It is hereby declared to be the pol-
icy of this Act... to alleviate certain problems which tend to discourage the
maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans."); see also H.R. REP.
No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2918, 2919-20,
2935, 2993, 3004 (giving reasons for changing rules for employers' liability);
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Anthony Co., 542 F. Supp. 43, 45 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(noting that withdrawal liability is intended "primarily... to prevent prema-
ture termination of a plan by an employee's real employer so as to frustrate the
employee's reasonable expectations as to pension benefits").
As enacted in 1974, ERISA required the PBGC to pay benefits for single
employer plans that terminated with insufficient assets to support their guar-
anteed benefits. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray Co., 467 U.S. 717,
720 (1984). The statute, however, made the PBGC's insurance of the benefits
promised by multiemployer pension plans discretionary until January 1, 1978,
when the PBGC would be required to begin insuring the benefits. Id. 467 U.S.
at 720. MPPAA superseded the multiemployer pension plan insurance provi-
sions of the 1974 statute. Id.
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plans to an immediate "withdrawal liability" instead of the pre-
vious "termination liability," which was contingent upon the
plan lasting less than five years.36 MPPAA imposes mandatory
liability on an employer, payable upon withdrawal from a mul-
tiemployer pension plan,3 7 for its pro rata share of the plan's
unfunded vested liability regardless of whether the plan later
terminates.38
C. APPLICATION OF WITiDRAwAL LiABLTY TO ALL TRADES OR
BusiNEssEs UNDER COMMON CONTROL
Withdrawal liability under ERISA, as amended, extends to
all "trades or businesses.., under common control," which are
jointly and severally liable for the withdrawal penalty incurred
by any member of the controlled group.39 In ERISA, as
amended, however, Congress failed to define the term "trades
or businesses under . . . common control." Instead, Congress
instructed the PBGC to promulgate explanatory regulations
"consistent and coextensive with" Treasury regulations imple-
menting a similar section of the Code.40 The PBGC has promul-
gated no such regulations. 4 1 The Treasury regulations to which
36. CUMMINGS & KERSHAW, supra, note 18, at A-7.
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 1382 (1988).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund v. Personnel, Inc., No. 90 C 1051, 1991 WL 104184, at *2 (N.D.
IM. June 12, 1991), rev'd, 974 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1992).
For a detailed discussion of how withdrawal liability is calculated, see
MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETmEmENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PLAs § 19.21 (1993 ed.).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (1988); Board of Trustees of the W. Conference of
Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Lafrenz, 837 F.2d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1988).
40. For example, § 1301(b)(1) of ERISA, as amended, provides as follows:
For purposes of this subchapter, under regulations prescribed by the
[PBGC], all employees of trades or businesses (whether or not incorpo-
rated) which are under common control shall be treated as employed
by a single employer and all such trades and businesses as a single
employer. The regulations prescribed under the preceding sentence
shall be consistent and coextensive with regulations prescribed for
similar purposes by the Secretary of the Treasury under section 414(c)
of [the Internal Revenue Code].
29 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1988). Section 414(c) states that "all employees of trades or
businesses (whether or not incorporated) which are under common control shall
be treated as employed by a single employer." I.R.C. § 414(c) (1988).
41. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Pension Fund v. Personnel,
Inc., 974 F.2d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Woodrum & McBride, supra
note 24, at 738 n.38 ("The PBGC's failure to develop implementing rules which
reflect the specific goals and issues relating to withdrawal from a multiem-
ployer plan lies at the very heart of the liability crisis employers now face.").
[Vol. 78:501
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Congress referred provide some guidance by defining "common
control,"42 but they do not define "trades or businesses."
43
D. DEFINITION OF "CoMMoN CONTROL"
Under the Treasury regulations promulgated pursuant to
section 414(c) of the Code,44 the term "two or more trades or
businesses under.. . common control" specifically encompasses
three types of commonly controlled business groups: parent-
subsidiary groups,45 brother-sister groups, 46 and combined
groups. 47 A "controlling interest" of eighty percent ownership
links each type of group.48
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Ouimet Corp.49 (Ouimet
1), the seminal case establishing joint and several withdrawal
liability for trades or businesses under common control, inter-
prets ERISA's controlled group provisions literally. The First
Circuit held that withdrawal liability applies to all members of
an employer's controlled group, regardless of whether those
members actually participated in "maintaining" the terminated
pension plan.50 Ouimet I establishes that the existence of a con-
42. See infra part I.D.
43. See infra part I.E.
44. 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(c)-2 (1993).
45. A "parent-subsidiary group" is "one or more chains of organizations
conducting trades or businesses connected through ownership of a controlling
interest with a common parent organization." 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(c)-2(b) (1993).
46. The regulations define "brother-sister group" as follows:
[T]wo or more organizations conducting trades or businesses if (i) the
same five or fewer persons who are individuals, estates, or trusts own
(directly and with the application of § 1.414(c)-4 (concerning construc-
tive ownership and attribution of ownership)) a controlling interest in
each organization, and (ii) taking into account the ownership of each
such person only to the extent such ownership is identical with respect
to each such organization, such persons are in effective control of each
organization. The five or fewer persons whose ownership is considered
for purposes of the controlling interest requirement for each organiza-
tion must be the same persons whose ownership is considered for pur-
poses of the effective control requirement.
26 C.F.R. § 1.414(c)-2(c) (1993).
47. A "combined group" is a chain of two or more parent-subsidiary and
brother-sister groups. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(c)-2(d) (1993).
48. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.414(c)-2(b) to (d) (1993).
49. 630 F.2d 4, 9-12 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 914 (1981).
50. Id. at 11-12. Although the First Circuit's decision in Ouimet predated
MPPAA, it remains good law since Congress enacted MPPAA, as Senator Wil-
liams, a principal sponsor of ERISA and MPPAA, explained:
Under current law, a group of trades or business under common con-
trol, whether or not incorporated, is treated as a single employer for
purposes of employer liability under Title IV. Thus, if a terminating
single employer plan is maintained by one or more members of a con-
5091993]
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trolled group depends solely on ownership and that the economic
interrelation or lack of interrelation between controlled group
members does not affect a controlled group's existence. 5 ' Since
Ouimet, the courts have decided numerous controlled group
cases in a manner consistent with Ouimet's literal interpreta-
tion of the regulations.52
E. DEFINITION OF "TRADES OR BusINESSES"
Controlled group liability cases involving disputes over the
definition of "trades or businesses" can lead to particularly seri-
ous consequences for those with liability at issue. These cases
necessarily focus on the activities of unincorporated entities.53
Thus, because unincorporated entities lack the limited liability
of corporations, the owners of those entities often face personal
liability.54
trolled group, the entire group is the "employer" and is responsible for
any employer liability. The leading case in this area is Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation v. Ouimet Corporation, 470 F. Supp. 945 (D.
Mass. 1979) [affirmed in Ouimet 11, in which the court correctly held
that all members of a controlled group are jointly and severally liable
for employer liability imposed under [29 U.S.C. § 1362].
126 CONG. REC. 23,287 (1980).
51. Ouimet, 630 F.2d at 11-12.
52. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,227-28
(1986); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Pension Fund v. Personnel, Inc.,
974 F.2d 789, 792-93 (7th Cir. 1992); Board of Trustees of the W. Conference of
Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Lafrenz, 837 F.2d 892, 894 n.6, 895 (9th Cir.
1988); ILGWU Nat'l Retirement Fund v. Minotola Indus., No. 88 Civ. 9131
(RJW), 1991 WL 79466, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1991); Central States, South-
east & Southwest Pension Fund v. Skyland Leasing Co., 691 F. Supp. 6, 11-12
(W.D. Mich. 1987), affd mem., 892 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1990); United Food &
Commercial Workers Union v. Progressive Supermarkets, 644 F. Supp. 633,
638 (D. N.J. 1986); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Center City Motors, Inc., 609
F. Supp. 409, 412 (S.D. Cal. 1984).
53. Few would deny that corporations are trades or businesses.
54. Personal liability arises from a claim against a commonly controlled
unincorporated business, not from piercing of the corporate veil. Thus, individ-
uals who hold controlling interests in unincorporated trades or businesses may
face personal liability for the withdrawal obligations of a corporation under
common control. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters
Pension Trust Fund v. H.F. Johnson, Inc., 830 F.2d 1009, 1014-15 (9th Cir.
1987) (establishing that joint venturers may become personally liable for with-
drawal liability incurred by a corporation under their common control). Courts
generally have refused to extend personal liability to officers or shareholders of
corporations withdrawing from multiemployer pension plans absent justifica-
tion for piercing the corporate veil. See DeBreceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, Inc.,
828 F.2d 877, 880-81 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988).
When a court "pierces the corporate veil" it disregards corporateness and
its attributes, including limited liability. HARRY G. HEN & JOHN R. ALEXAN-
DER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS AND O=HR BusINEss ENTERPmSEs 344 (3d ed.
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Despite the potentially serious consequences for an individ-
ual deemed to operate a trade or business, no clear definition of
the term has emerged. Neither the Code nor any Treasury regu-
lations defines "trades or businesses" for general purposes.55 In-
stead, courts have attached various meanings to the term
depending on the purpose of the Code section in which the term
appears.56 In withdrawal liability cases, the courts have repeat-
edly declared that the term "trades or businesses" must be un-
derstood in light of ERISA's purposes.57 In the absence of better
1983). As a general rule, courts will not pierce the corporate veil, even with
respect to controlling shareholders, when "corporate formalities are substan-
tially observed, initial financing [is] reasonably adequate, and the corporation
[is] not formed to evade an existing obligation or a statute or to cheat or to
defraud." Id. at 347, 352-54.
In DeBreceni, the court refused to apply an "economic reality" test, which
would allow courts to impose personal liability on one who maintains almost
complete control over day to day operations of a corporation. DeBrecini, 828
F.2d at 877. The court rejected the pension plan's argument that the public
policy embodied in the statute favored imposing personal liability on controlling
shareholders of a withdrawing corporation:
[P]ersonal liability would discourage controlling shareholders and of-
ficers from directing their corporations to contribute to multi-employer
pension plans, thereby making it less likely that their employees will
receive pension benefits. In the long run, personal liability would hurt
even those employees who are already beneficiaries of multi-employer
pension plans, because the vitality of those plans depends on new em-
ployers contributing to them.
Id. at 881 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2918, 2919-20, 2935).
55. The concept... has a well-known and almost constant presence on
our tax-law terrain. Despite this, the Code has never contained a defi-
nition of the words "trade or business" for general application, and no
regulation has been issued expounding its meaning for all purposes.
Neither has a broadly applicable authoritative judicial definition
emerged.
Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
56. In Groetzinger, the Supreme Court observed that the phrase "trade or
business" occurred in more than 50 sections and more than 800 subsections of
the tax code and in "hundreds of places in proposed and final income tax regula-
tions." Id. at 27. One observer recently estimated that the term appeared in at
least 492 subsections of the tax code and in over 644 regulations and noted that
over the past 25 years Congress has "increased dramatically" its use of the
term. F. Ladson Boyle, What is a Trade or Business?, 39 TAX LAw. 737, 737 &
n.3 (1986).
57. See, e.g., Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 27 (explaining the need to ascertain
the meaning of "trade or business" as it appears in the Code); Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Pension Fund v. Personnel, Inc., 974 F.2d 789, 794 (7th
Cir. 1992) (recognizing that courts have construed "trade or business" in accord-
ance with Congress' purpose in enacting that section); Board of Trustees of the
W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Lafrenz, 837 F.2d 892, 894
n.6 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the definition of "trade or business" is not
clearly defined in the Code); ILGWU Nat'l Retirement Fund v. Minotola Indus.,
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alternatives, however, courts have turned for guidance to inter-
pretations of the Code.58
The Eighth Circuit has summarized the types of situations
in which courts have found the existence of a trade or business:
"vehicle leasing operations conducted for profit; vehicle and real
property leases between two entities under common control; and
the subsistence of one commonly controlled entity, directly or in-
directly, partly or entirely, upon the revenues generated by a
second commonly controlled entity."5 9 In three recent cases, the
No. 88 Civ. 9131 (RJW), 1991 WL 79466, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1991) (not-
ing that absent guidance in the statute or regulations about the definition of the
term "trade or business," one must "look to the purpose of the section of the
statute in which the phrase appears in order to determine whether a particular
set of circumstances is encompassed by its intended meaning"); Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Lloyd L. Sztanyo Trust, 693 F.
Supp., 531, 536 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (the term "trade or business"-because it is
not defined in § 414(c)-should be interpreted in light of intentions of ERISA);
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Pension Fund v. Skyland Leasing Co.,
691 F. Supp. 6, 11-12 (W.D. Mich. 1987) ("single employer" under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1301(b)(1) must be interpreted in light of statutory purpose for imposing with-
drawal liability), affd mem., 892 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1990); United Food & Com-
mercial Workers Union v. Progressive Supermarkets, 644 F. Supp. 633, 638
(D.N.J. 1986) ("trade or business" should be interpreted in light of intentions of
ERISA); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Center City Motors, Inc., 609 F. Supp.
409, 411-12 (S.D. Cal. 1984) ("trade or business" must be construed in light of
purpose of statute).
58. Personnel, 974 F.2d at 796 (citing Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 35). In
Groetzinger, the leading case interpreting the "trade or business" provisions of
I.R.C. § 162(a), the Supreme Court held that a full-time gambler who bets solely
for his own benefit engages in a trade or business for the purpose of deducting
business expenses. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 24, 35-36. The Court qualified its
holding:
Of course, not every income-producing and profit-making endeavor
constitutes a trade or business. The income tax law, almost from the
beginning, has distinguished between a business or trade, on the one
hand, and "transactions entered into for profit but not connected with
... business or trade," on the other .... We accept the fact that to be
engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the
activity with continuity and regularity and that the taxpayer's primary
purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit. A
sporadic activity, a hobby, or an amusement diversion does not qualify.
Id. at 35 (citation omitted). The Groetzinger Court concluded that the defend-
ant "pursued [gambling] full time, in good faith, and with regularity, to the
production of income for a livelihood, and.., not [as] a mere hobby." Id.
59. Vaughn v. Sexton, 975 F.2d 498,503 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1268 (1993) (citing Lafrenz, 837 F.2d at 894-95; Trustees of the Amalga-
mated Ins. Fund v. Saltz, 760 F. Supp. 55, 57-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Sztanyo
Trust, 693 F. Supp. at 537-38; Skyland Leasing, 691 F. Supp. at 12; Central
States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Long, 687 F. Supp. 298,
301 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. Bay, 684 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Progressive Supermar-
kets, 644 F. Supp. at 639; Center City Motors, 609 F. Supp. at 412).
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Seventh Circuit held defendants personally liable under a con-
trolled group theory because the defendants were leasing prop-
erty to a commonly controlled business when the business
withdrew from a multiemployer pension plan.60 Similarly, the
Eighth Circuit recently held that a "Family Trust" that leased
real property to a commonly controlled company is a trade or
business for purposes of controlled group withdrawal liability.
61
Occasionally, the courts have had to determine whether
ownership of assets that are not leased to a commonly controlled
business rises to the level of a trade or business. In Textile
Workers Pension Fund v. Oltremare,62 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that mere ownership of
land, even if purchased and held with an intent to develop the
land, is not a trade or business. The Oltremare court found that
"the property ha[d] been nothing more than a personal asset
similar to a custody account with a bank."63 Two years later, in
ILGWU National Retirement Fund v. Minotola Industries,64 the
60. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Ditello,
974 F.2d 887, 890-91 (7th Cir. 1992); Central States, Southeast & Southwest
Areas Pension Fund v. Koder, 969 F.2d 451, 451-52 (7th Cir. 1992); Central
States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Slotky, 956 F.2d 1369,
1374-75 (7th Cir. 1992).
61. The trust, established in 1980, had leased real property in 1986 and
1987 to a company that withdrew from a multiemployer pension plan. Vaughn,
975 F.2d at 503-04. The defendant (as individual and trustee) argued on appeal
that the trust's primary purpose was estate planning rather than income-gener-
ation, that the trust's income generating activities were not "continuous or reg-
ular enough to amount to the acts of a trade or business," and that the income-
generating activities had not yet taken place when the withdrawal liability
arose. Id. at 503.
The trial court held that leasing real property to a company under common
control established the existence of a trade or business for withdrawal liability
purposes although, as the Eighth Circuit recognized, the trial court did not ad-
dress the question of when the property leasing had occurred. Id. at 502-03.
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the plaintiff pension plan that, because the de-
fendant failed to raise the issue of when the trust became a trade or business at
trial, the defendant was barred from raising it on appeal. Id. Thus, the court
avoided answering the question whether leasing real estate to a commonly con-
trolled trade or business is economically unrelated to the withdrawing trade or
business if the defendant terminates the lease, if the trust owns the property,
or, as in Personnel, if the employer disposes of the property. Id. at 502-04.
62. Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Oltremare, 764 F. Supp. 287, 289
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
63. Id.
64. ILGWU Nat'l Retirement Fund v. Minotola Indus., No. 88 Civ. 9131
(RJW), 1991 WL 79466, at *2-*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1991). In Minotola, the de-
fendants, husband and wife, jointly purchased a 300-acre Arkansas farm in
1976 for investment purposes. Id. at *2. From 1976 to 1983, they used the land
only for "cultivating and marketing its produce." From 1984 to 1991, they
1993]
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same court held that ownership and leasing of an unincorpo-
rated farm is a trade or business for withdrawal liability
purposes.
Recently, in Personnel, the Seventh Circuit imposed per-
sonal liability on the sole shareholder of a personnel leasing cor-
poration because of the shareholder's unrelated real estate
ownership. The employer owned and leased an apartment
building at the time his corporation withdrew from the plan and
had owned and leased various other properties before his corpo-
ration withdrew from the plan.65
II. CENTRAL STATES v. PERSONNEL, INC.
A. PERRELLE'S UNEXPECTED PERSONAL LLBrY
Eugene Perrelle began operating Personnel, Inc.,66 a truck
driver leasing company, in 1963 from his home in Kenosha, Wis-
consin.67 From the start, Personnel operated under collective
bargaining agreements that required Perrelle to contribute to
the local Teamsters' multiemployer pension plan.68 As required
by the agreements, Personnel contributed regularly to the
union's pension fund in amounts dictated by collective bargain-
ing agreements between the Teamsters and the larger trucking
leased the farm to several individual tenants and received rental income. The
farm and Minotola, the defendants' wholly-owned garment manufacturing cor-
poration, were "separate and distinct entities." No Minotola money, equipment,
or employees were used for the farm. Id. The court explained that "there is no
absolute requirement that there be a nexus between the withdrawing entity
and the alleged trade or business under common control in order for controlled
group liability to be found." Id. at *4.
65. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Pension Fund v. Personnel,
Inc., 974 F.2d 789, 791-92, 796 (7th Cir. 1992). In Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Ditello, 974 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1992), decided
one month after Personnel, the Seventh Circuit mistakenly claimed that it had
encountered its first case in which no economic nexus existed. Id.
66. Perrelle was president and sole shareholder of the Wisconsin corpora-
tion. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Personnel,
Inc., No. 90 C 1051, 1991 WL 104184 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 1991), rev'd, 974 F.2d
789, 791 (7th Cir. 1992).
67. Brief and Supplemental Appendix of Appellee at 4, Central States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Personnel, Inc., 974 F.2d 789
(7th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-2392) [hereinafter Perrelle Brief]. As a personnel leas-
ing agency, Personnel did not own or operate trucks, equipment, or garages. Id.
68. Id. Personnel operated under successive collective bargaining agree-
ments with the Teamsters Local No. 43. Id.
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firms in Southeastern Wisconsin. 69 For the first ten years, Per-
relle paid himself no salary and no rent.70
From 1973 to 1980, Personnel operated from an office in Ra-
cine, Wisconsin. 71 Then, in 1980, the corporation moved to a Ra-
cine farmhouse owned by Perrelle and began paying rent to
Perrelle. 72 Perrelle worked about sixty to eighty hours a week
during the 1970s and early 1980s.7 3 In the early to mid-1980s,
however, Personnel lost business when deregulation increased
competitiveness in the trucking industry.74 Perrelle worked
about forty hours a week during the mid-1980s as the volume of
business decreased.7 5
In the fall of 1985, Perrelle moved the company back to his
home and stopped paying rent.76 The corporation reduced its
workforce and its pension fund contributions.7 7 By the summer
of 1987, Personnel had ceased operations. The union's pension
fund, Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension
Fund ("Central States"), determined that Personnel's reduction
in contributions had constituted a "partial withdrawal" on or
about December 31, 1986 and assessed Personnel a withdrawal
liability of $283,165.30.78
Ineligible to participate in the Teamsters' pension plan,7 9
Perrelle had maintained various long-term investments, includ-
ing real estate investments, for his family's retirement secur-
ity.80 Perrelle never took capital from Personnel to invest for his
69. Id.
70. Id. After the first ten years, Perrelle often took only a small salary, less
than most of his drivers received. Id. at 7. Perrelle's salary from the company
never exceeded $53,000 a year. Id.
71. Id. at 5. Personnel paid rent to the owner of the building. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 6-7.
74. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Pension Fund v. Personnel, 974
F.2d 789, 791 (7th Cir. 1992).
75. Perrelle Brief, supra note 67, at 6-7.
76. Id. at 7. Personnel operated out of Perrelle's home rent-free. Id.
77. Personnel, 794 F.2d at 791.
78. Id. Neither Personnel nor Perrelle disputed the withdrawal liability
amount. Id. at 792.
79. Perrelle Brief, supra note 67, at 5. Personnel's collective bargaining
agreement with Central States barred Perrelle, as manager of Personnel, from
participating in the pension plan. Id.
80. Id. Perrelle contributed to an individual retirement account and made
other long-term investments. Id. On the advice of an investment counselor, he
invested in some real properties because of the expected long-term appreciation
and tax shelter benefits. Id. At one time, he owned as many as 10 properties.
See Brief of Appellants at 5-7, Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund v. Personnel, Inc., 974 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-2392)
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own retirement or for other purposes, even upon Personnel's liq-
uidation.8 ' When Personnel withdrew from the pension plan in
1986, Perrelle held controlling interests in only two properties:
a Sturtevant, Wisconsin apartment building and his Kenosha
home.82
B. THE DISTRICT CouRT's ERRONEOUS Focus ON EcONOMIC
NExus
The only issue at trial was whether Perrelle's real estate ac-
tivities constituted a "trade or business." 83 Central States con-
[hereinafter Central States Brief]. During the years preceding and following
Personnel's withdrawal from the pension plan, Perrelle held or leased the fol-
lowing properties:
Year Properties Activity Gain Notes
1984 10 Sold $6,461 Held less than one year.
6 Leased NA
1985 1 Sold $15,413 Owned six years and leased to
Personnel until the sale.
3 Bought & Sold NA Held less than six months.
5 Leased NA
1986 1 Sold $6,187 Owned and leased for five
years.
1 (1/2 int.) Sold $5,874
1 Leased NA
2 (1/2 int.) Leased NA




81. Perrelle Brief, supra note 67, at 6 (explaining the source of Perelle's
real estate investment funds).
82. Id. at 9. Perrelle purchased the apartment building in 1977. Id. He
also owned a 50% interest in another apartment building at the time Personnel
withdrew from the pension plan. Id.
83. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Person-
nel, Inc., No. 90 C 1051, 1991 WL 104184, at *2-*3 (N.D. IM. June 12, 1991).
The court explained that the entities clearly satisfied the "controlling interest"
requirement of 26 C.F.R. § 11.414(c)-2(b)(2)(1)(c) and (d) (for a corporation, at
least 80% of the voting shares; for a sole proprietorship, complete ownership)
and the "effective control" requirement of 26 C.F.R. § 11.414(c)-2(c)(2)(iii) and
(iv) (for a corporation, at least 50% of the combined voting power of all the vot-
ing stock; for a sole proprietorship, complete ownership). Id. at *2.
According to the district court, Central States alleged that Perrelle for-
feited his right to contest liability by failing to submit the matter to arbitration
in a timely manner pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1). Id. at *3. The court
decided this issue in Personnel's favor, stating that under a "well-settled" ex-
ception to the arbitration requirement, a party need not contest withdrawal lia-
bility through arbitration if the dispute is over whether a party may be deemed
an "employer" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1). Id. In its reply
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tended that, as the sole shareholder of a personnel leasing
corporation and the sole proprietor of a real estate business, Per-
relle operated a "brother-sister" group of businesses. 84 Perrelle,
however, characterized his real estate activity as "purely a per-
sonal investment strategy to provide for his retirement." 5 Per-
sonnel argued that, because Perrelle operated only one business,
no commonly controlled group of businesses could have
existed.8 6
The district court recognized that the term "trade or busi-
ness" limited, at least somewhat, the scope of activities the con-
trolled group provisions cover87 and that determining whether
an activity constitutes a trade or business is "essentially [a] fac-
tual determination."88 Reasoning that no economic nexus con-
nected Perrelle's real estate investments and his truck driver
leasing company8 9 and that the investments bore "none of the
marks of a business,"90 the court held that Perrelle's real estate
activities constituted personal investments rather than a trade
or business within the meaning of § 1301(b)(1). 91
brief, however, Central States explained that it had merely contended that Per-
relle's failure to timely request arbitration waived his right to contest the
amount of the withdrawal liability. Reply of Appellants, Central States, South-
east & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, et al., at 3-4, Central States, Southeast
& Southwest Pension Fund v. Personnel, Inc., 974 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1992) (No.
91-2392).
84. Personnel, No. 90 C 1051, 1991 WL 104184, at *2 (N.D. IM. June 12,
1991). Central States bolstered its argument with evidence that Perrelle and
his wife deducted on their joint federal income tax return expenses for advertis-
ing, utilities, repairs, and depreciation. Central States, Southeast & Southwest
Pension Fund v. Personnel, 974 F.2d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1992).
85. Personnel, No. 90 C 1051, 1991 WL 104184, at *3 (N.D. IMI. June 12,
1991).
86. Id.
87. The court recognized that "[w]ithdrawal liability under the statute was
not intended to encompass every economic activity undertaken by a sole share-
holder." Id. at *7.
88. Id. at *4. The district court observed that the courts have avoided "the
application of inflexible rules" to such determinations by holding that "whether
an entity may be termed a 'trade or business' is an essentially factual determi-
nation." Id.
89. Id. at *7.
90. Id. The district court observed that Perrelle had no customers, employ-
ees, office, telephone, or employer identification number associated with his
real estate holdings. Id. Also, he apparently had not filed a self-employment
tax form. Id.
91. Id. at *5-7.
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C. THE SEVENTH CmcUITs REERSAL: LIMITED CRITERIA FOR
DEFINING TRADE OR BusnEss
The Seventh Circuit rightly rejected the district court's cre-
ation of an economic nexus requirement where the statute did
not explicitly impose one. 92 The court examined Perrelle's real
estate holdings over a period of at least four years and found
that Perrelle had regularly and continuously invested.93 The
court also viewed Perrelle's claim of tax deductions for advertis-
ing, utility, repair, and depreciation expenses as "strong evi-
dence" that Perrelle "treated his real estate activities as a
business." 94 Perrelle contended that his real estate holdings did
not produce enough income to support him and that, for the
most part, he operated at a loss or merely broke even. The court
found that Perrelle nonetheless had designed his activities to
produce income.95 Based on the continuity of Perelle's invest-
ment activity, his claim of tax deductions, and his goal of earn-
ing a profit, the court concluded that Perrelle's activities rose to
the level of a trade or business.96
III. THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH PERSONAL
INVESTMENTS FROM TRADES OR BUSINESSES
Personnel's interpretation of the term "trades or businesses"
fails to distinguish personal investments from trades or busi-
nesses. Under Personnel, assets owned primarily for investment
purposes become potential avenues to enormous controlled
group withdrawal liability. Consequently, employers may avoid
participating in multiemployer pension plans, thereby limiting a
means for their employees to secure retirement incomes.
92. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Pension Fund v. Personnel,
Inc., 974 F.2d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 1992). The court asserted that, in any event,
there was an economic nexus in Personnel because Perrelle had rented an office
to Personnel from 1980 to 1985. Id.
93. Id. at 795-96.
94. Id. at 795.
95. Id. at 796.
96. Id. The court stated that it found the Groetzinger definition of "trade or
business" to be "helpful," even though in Groetzinger the Court admittedly had
been interpreting a tax code section rather than an ERISA section. Id. at 794
(citing Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1986)).
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A. ERISA EVIDENCES AN INTENT TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN
INVESTMENTS AND "TRADES OR BUSINESSES"
ERISA leaves the term "trades or businesses... under com-
mon control" undefined.97 In ERISA, however, Congress ex-
pressly directed the PBGC to develop new regulations to govern
withdrawal liability.98 Congress thus intended the PBGC to
clarify the definition of the term "trades or businesses... under
common control" administratively. 99 In addition, Congress rec-
ognized that the courts necessarily would play a role in filling
the gaps in the pension statutes and regulations. 00
Congress has provided some direction for interpreting the
term "common control." ERISA directs the PBGC to promulgate
regulations "consistent and co-extensive with" Treasury regula-
tions that define common control by reference to a precise quan-
tum of overlapping ownership.' 0 ' Congress did not provide
explicit direction for interpreting the term "trades or busi-
nesses." Pre-MPPAA common law "trade or business" doctrine,
however, recognizes a distinction, however ill-defined, between a
trade or business and an investment.10 2 Congress apparently
intended to recognize a similar distinction in the withdrawal lia-
bility context because it referred to Treasury regulations that
recognize the distinction. 0 3 To delineate the contours of the dis-
tinction between "trades or businesses" and investments, the
PBGC and the courts should look to the general purposes of ER-
ISA's controlled group and withdrawal liability provisions.
97. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (interpreting trades or
businesses under section 1301(b)(1) of ERISA).
98. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
100. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Anthony Co., 542 F. Supp. 43, 44
(N.D. Ill. 1982). The court asserted that "[ilt should be emphasized again that
Congress left the shaping-the fine tuning-to the Secretary of the Treasury.
It was the experts' job to draft the Regulations in a way that would accomplish
the congressional goals without doing violence to reason...." Id. at 45. Con-
gress "intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the
courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare
and pension plans." Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v.
H.F. Johnson, Inc., 830 F.2d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 120 CONG. REC.
29,942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits)).
101. See supra Part I.D.
102. See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 28-32 (1986) (summariz-
ing case law interpreting the term "trade or business" in the Code).
103. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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B. ERISA's CONTROLLED GROUP PROvisIoNs WERE INTENDED
TO PREVENT EVASION OF LIABILITY THROUGH
MANIPULATION OF CORPORATE FoRM
When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, it incorporated the
controlled group provisions to prevent employers from evading
ERISA's minimum coverage and funding provisions.1 0 4 Con-
trolled group liability treats employees of all commonly con-
trolled business entities as if employed by a single employer. 10 5
Under the controlled group provisions, employers cannot evade
ERISA's requirements by dividing operations into separate
units and, for example, providing qualified pension plans only to
those units employing the owners, officers, or more highly paid
employees;10 6 the minimum coverage and funding requirements
that apply to the employees of a business entity apply to the em-
ployees of all commonly controlled business entities. 0 7
Congress may have intended the controlled group provi-
sions primarily to ensure fair treatment of employees who
are, at least in form, employed by different business entities,
but the provisions also tend to protect employees in a more
general way. Congress designed the controlled group rules to
prevent employers from intentionally promising greater
pension benefits than they would be able to supply, 08
104. See S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C-A.N. 4890, 4928; see also H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 50
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4716.
105. The controlled group concept, in the form it takes in ERISA, was first
used to prevent abuses in the use of multiple corporate surtax exemptions by
related employers. See S. REP. No. 383, supra note 104, at 4928.
106. Woodrum & McBride, supra note 24, at 743, 743 n.56 ("Section 235 of
the Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19, added Code sections
1561-1563 effective in 1964, limiting opportunities for companies to realize tax
saving by merely splitting into multiple corporations.") (quoting H.R. REP No.
749, 88th Cong. 2d. Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 1426).
107. CumMINGs & KERsHAw, supra note 18, at A-7 to A-8.
108. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085, 1092
(1st Cir.) (Ouimet I), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983). In Ouimet I, the trial
court observed, "[olne purpose of ERISA is ... preventing employers from prom-
ising more than they can deliver by way of benefits when negotiating collective
bargaining agreements.... The statute reflects Congress' judgment that, with-
out controlled group liability, businesses could juggle their activities to eviscer-
ate the termination liability provisions of ERISA." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. Ouimet Corp., 470 F. Supp. 945, 955 (D. Mass. 1976).
In Ouimet II, the First Circuit quoted ERISA's legislative history:
Concern was expressed to the committee that in the absence of appro-
priate safeguards under an insurance system, an employer might es-
tablish or amend a plan to provide substantial benefits with the
realization that its funding may be inadequate to pay the benefits
called for. Such an employer might, it was argued, rely on the insur-
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in response to the "moral hazard" created by the PBGC's
insurance.'0 9
Controlled group liability also safeguards pension benefits
simply by maximizing the pool of money available to fund a
withdrawal assessment. 10 The legislative history of the 1974
statute, however, contains only passing reference to the con-
trolled group mechanism as a method of extending liability."'
C. ERISA's Wr=rHDtwAL LI LITY PROVISIONS EMBODY
CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES
Congress clearly intended ERISA, as amended, to ensure
that workers receive the pension benefits they expect and de-
serve.112 The statute, however, is complicated, and the various
provisions designed to guarantee workers' benefits represent a
balancing of competing concerns.
On the one hand, Congress tried to discourage employers
from promising their employees greater pension benefits than
the employers would be able to provide. 113 An expansive inter-
pretation of the term "trades or businesses" tends to benefit
workers by discouraging employers from intentionally promis-
ing unrealistically high benefit levels and by maximizing the as-
set pool available to cover promised pension benefits.
On the other hand, throughout their deliberations, legisla-
tors were conscious of the need to avoid unduly burdening busi-
nesses. 114 Congress recognized that termination liability rules
endangered workers' pension benefits by encouraging employers
to withdraw from already-precarious plans, discouraging them
from entering into existing plans, and discouraging them from
ance as the backup which enables it to be more generous in promising
pension benefits to meet labor demands than would be the case if it
knew that the benefits would have to be paid for entirely out of the
assets of the employer.
711 F.2d at 1092 (quoting S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4971).
109. For a detailed discussion of the moral hazard problem attending the
PBGC's insurance system, see Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy
and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 65 (1991) (arguing that the PBGC is
poorly equipped to monitor pension funding).
110. If any of a withdrawing employer's controlled group members are going
concerns at the time of the withdrawal, controlled group liability increases the
pool of money available to fund the withdrawal assessment.
111. See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C-N. 5038, 5155.
112. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 27.
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forming new plans.115 By replacing termination liability with
withdrawal liability, MPPAA reduces the incentive for partici-
pating employers to withdraw from multiemployer plans. Evi-
dence suggests, however, that MPPAA rules also deter new
employers from entering the plans." 6 A narrower interpreta-
tion of the term "trades or businesses" tends to accomplish the
objective of limiting the burden on employers.
D. COURTS HAVE USED BROADER ANALYSES TO CLASsIFY
ASSETS UNDER FEDERAL INcoME TAx LAws
Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 17 which the Seventh Circuit
found "helpful" in its Personnel analysis," 58 identifies two main
requirements for an activity to constitute a trade or business for
purposes of business deductions: the activity must be conducted
for profit, rather than for recreation, and the activity must be
conducted with continuity and regularity.119 In holding that a
full-time gambler conducted a trade or business, the Groetzinger
Court recognized that these two factors were not always exhaus-
tive but did not identify other factors that the courts ought to
consider. 120 Moreover, although the Court recognized that man-
aging and preserving one's assets is not a trade or business
115. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
116. CUMMINGS & KERSHAW, supra note 18, at A-7. No multiemployer pen-
sion plans have been created in the United States since 1980. See J. Daniel
Plants, Note, Employer Recapture of ERISA Contributions Made by Mistake: A
Federal Common Law Remedy To Prevent Unjust Enrichment, 89 MICH. L. Rlv.
2000, 2034 & n.217 (1991) (citing Employee Pension Protection: Hearings on
H.R. 1661 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1989) (testimony of
Rep. Erlenborn)). Thousands of multiemployer pension plans, however, termi-
nated during the 1980s. See Employee Pension Protection Act of 1989: Hearings
on S. 685 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1989) (comment of Chairman
Metzenbaum).
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has been unable to determine the
extent to which withdrawal liability has deterred entry of new employers into
multiemployer plans. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 16. According to the GAO,
pension plan officials representing plans in declining industries, which had ex-
perienced no growth rate before MPPAA, generally did not expect new employ-
ers to enter into their plans. Id. Officials representing plans with growth
potential, however, generally believed that MPPAA's creation of withdrawal lia-
bility would discourage new employers from entering their plans. Id.
117. 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
118. See supra note 96.
119. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 35; see also DANML M. SHAVIRO, PASSIVE Loss
RuLEs at A-34 (BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolio No. 454-2d, 1993) (discussing the two
requirements for an activity to constitute a trade).
120. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 36.
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under the business deduction provision, it did not specify how
the activity of managing and preserving one's assets ought to be
distinguished from the operation of a trade or business.121
In relying on the Groetzinger analysis, the Seventh Circuit
overlooked other contexts in which courts distinguish trades or
businesses from investments under federal income tax law. For
example, to determine whether a taxpayer holds property as a
mere investment or, rather, acts as a dealer by holding property
"primarily for sale" in the ordinary course of a trade or business
for purposes of defining capital assets, 122 courts have engaged in
a multifactoral analysis, 123 yielding a host of highly fact-depen-
dent judicial decisions. 124 Also, federal tax law generally treats
121. The Supreme Court accepted the holding of Higgins v. Commissioner,
312 U.S. 212 (1941), "that managing and preserving investment assets is not a
trade or business activity even if engaged in for profit and on a full-time basis."
SHAVIRo, supra note 119, at A-34.
122. See 26 U.S.C. § 1221(1) (1988) (excluding from capital assets "property
held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
his trade or business").
123. The courts have considered:
(1) the frequency, number, and continuity of the sales; (2) subdivision,
platting, and other improvements or developments tending to make
the property more marketable; (3) the extent to which the taxpayer
engaged in sales activity; (4) the length of time the property has been
held; (5) the substantiality of the income derived from the sales, and
what percentage that is of the taxpayer's total income; (6) the nature of
the taxpayer's business; (7) the taxpayer's purpose in acquiring and
holding the property; (8) the extent of sales promotional activity such
as advertising, and (9) the listing of property for sale directly or
through brokers.
Gault v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1964) (citing Kaltreider v. Commis-
sioner, 255 F.2d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1958)). "It is difficult to attach an absolute or
specific degree of importance to the particular factors involved, and in part the
weight of any one factor has depended on the combination of others with which
it occurred." Id. at 96 (citing MERTENS LAw OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION
§ 22.138 n.69, 623-34 (Zimet & Weiss Rev.); see also Friend v. Commissioner,
198 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1952).
124. See, e.g., Gault, 332 F.2d at 95 ("Because there is a good deal of overlap-
ping between business and investment property in this area, the cases are le-
gion."); Kelley v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1960) ("Indeed, the
case law has grown to a jungle-like abundance accompanied by much of the
welter and impenetrability which such fertility produces."); Biedenharn Realty
Co. v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 1331, 1331 (D. La. 1973) ("the 'old, familiar,
recurring, vexing and ofttimes elusive' problem" of distinguishing capital gains
from ordinary income), afftd, 509 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.), and reh'g, 526 F.2d 409
(5th Cir.) (en banc), and cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1975); see also Stanley S.
Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 985
(1956); Stanley Weithorn, Subdivisions of Real Estate-'Dealer" v. "Investor"
Problem, 11 TAx L. REv. 157 (1956).
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rental activity as a "passive" activity rather than a trade or busi-
ness for purpose of loss deductions. 125
The Seventh Circuit should have looked beyond the Groetz-
inger analysis and considered factors that the courts have devel-
oped for examining capital gains and passive loss claims. That
is, it should have looked beyond Perelle's profit motive and the
continuity of his activity and considered such factors as the fol-
lowing: frequency of sales, improvements to the property, the
extent to which the property owner engaged in sales and promo-
tional activity, the percentage of the taxpayer's total income de-
rived from the activity, the nature of the taxpayer's business,
the taxpayer's purpose in acquiring and holding the property,
and the use of brokers for selling the property. Such an analysis
recognizes the limitations of the Groetzinger approach in distin-
guishing between operation of a trade or business and manag-
ment of one's investments. Both activities usually will be
conducted regularly and continuously, and both may yield prof-
its. A broader analysis more closely reflects the purpose of an
individual's real estate ownership and of ERISA's controlled
group withdrawal liability provisions. Under this broader anal-
ysis, Perrelle probably would not be characterized as the propri-
etor of a real estate trade or business.
E. _PERSONNEL MAY DISCOURAGE EMPLOYERS FROM
PARTICIPATING IN MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLANS
Certainly employers who are aware of the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of the controlled group provisions can plan their
personal finances accordingly. Although Personnel's outcome
would likely surprise the average small business owner, busi-
ness owners may avoid personal controlled group liability by
avoiding ownership of real estate or by owning a stake in real
estate that has been incorporated. Many business owners, how-
ever, will likely want to continue to hold real estate among their
investments. Investors, both small and large, commonly include
real estate in their portfolios. 126 They should be able to do so
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-1T(e)(ii) (West 1990). Rental activity may be a
trade or business activity, "if the rental operations are treated as incidental
under the '80-20' rule of egs. § 1.469-4T(d)(2)." SHAVmo, supra note 119, at A-
33 n.346.
126. Investors often invest part of their portfolios in real estate as a hedge
against inflation. Traditionally, real estate has performed well in inflationary
times, whereas stocks and bonds historically have declined when interest rates
rise. Peggie R. Elgin, Real Estate Slump Burns Pension Funds, Offers Opportu-
nities, 12 CoRP. CAsHFLow, Apr. 1991, at 7. Real estate investments can help
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without having to incorporate these assets. 27 Moreover, incor-
poration will not shield an individual who holds all shares of the
incorporated asset from controlled group liability. Thus, busi-
ness owners may choose to avoid the risk of an unfavorable with-
drawal liability determination by avoiding participation in
multiemployer plans. This result contravenes ERISA's avowed
purpose.
Some argue that controlled group liability merely consti-
tutes a business risk and that employers can decrease the likeli-
hood of incurring substantial withdrawal liability by adequately
capitalizing their employees' pension plans.' 28 Often, however,
individual employers have little or no control over the extent to
which their employees' plans are funded.' 29 Small family busi-
nesses operating under regional or national wage agreements
typify many of the industries in which multiemployer plans are
commonplace. :3 0 These businesses have little control over the
terms of the labor agreements under which they begin opera-
tions. 13 ' In addition, individual employers often have no power
to influence collectively bargained future benefit increases,
which increase a plan's vested liabilities and therefore increase
increase investment return while reducing overall portfolio risk. Michael Sivy,
How You Can Make Money in 1992, MONEY, 1991 (Special Year-End Edition) at
50.
127. Real estate activities traditionally have been conducted in unincorpo-
rated form. KAREN C. BURKE, FEDERAL INcoiM TAXATION OF PARTNERS AND
PARTNERSMPS IN A NUTsHELL 35 (1992).
128. See, e.g., Israel Goldowitz & Thomas S. Gigot, The Controlled Group
Rule for Purposes of the Withdrawal Liability Provisions of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act, 90 W. VA. L. REv. 773, 789 (1988) ("Such potential
liability is but one cost of doing business, and nothing prevents such a partici-
pating business from preparing, through adequate capitalization, for the possi-
bility of incurring withdrawal liability.").
129. See, e.g., Woodrum & McBride, supra note 24, at 751-53. Unionized
coal industry employers, for example, operate subject to a uniform national la-
bor agreement bargained between the United Mine Workers of America and the
Bituminous Coal Operators' Association (BCOA). BCOA members account for a
majority of all production under the labor agreement but comprise only a small
percentage of the employers (130 of 2000 signatory employers in 1981) signa-
tory to the agreement. Id. at 751. Independent producers were "expected and,
if necessary, compelled to follow the pattern" of the labor agreement. Id. (quot-
ing C. PERRY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE DECLINE OF THE UNITED MINE
WORKERS 162 (U. of Pa. Industrial Res. Unit No. 60, 1984)).
130. See supra note 129.
131. Collective bargaining agreements govern the level of pension benefits
to which employees are entitled as well as the size of the contributions partici-
pating employers are required to make to fund the plan. See infra note 129 and
accompanying text.
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the employers' financial exposure. 132 Even employers that, like
Personnel, pay all plan contributions required by their collec-
tively-bargained agreements can become liable for large
amounts of unfunded vested benefits.
F. AN ExPANsrvE DEFINITION OF TRADES OR BusiN~ssss FAILS
TO ADDRESS MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS' SERIOUS
FUNDING PROBLEMS
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of ERISA's "trades or
businesses" language places the risk of severe and unanticipated
financial burdens on individuals and their families, while failing
to address the underlying problems that create pension plan un-
derfunding. Scholars offer three reasons for the PBGC's mas-
sive deficit: the PBGC's "shoddy enforcement" practices, 13 3 a
statutory design that allows employers too much discretion to
determine their annual minimum funding obligations, and the
PBGC's insurance of "past service liability."13 4 They cite the
third reason, the PBGC's insurance of "past service liability,"135
as the largest cause of the PBGC's projected deficits. 13 6 Thus,
132. Future benefit increases may increase an employer's financial exposure
by requiring an increase in the level of ongoing contributions and by increasing
the level of unfunded vested benefits. The greater the unfunded vested bene-
fits, the greater a multiemployer pension plan's withdrawal liability.
133. Examples of inadequate enforcement include lax monitoring, overly lib-
eral granting of minimum funding waivers, and tardiness in terminating un-
derfunded plans. Keating, supra note 16, at 809-10.
134. Id. at 810-811.
135. Past service liability is the employer's funding liability for benefits
based on the years an employee worked before the plan was established. Id. at
811.
136. Id. at 811-12 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 412(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988), which provides
for the past services of employees to be credited when a new plan is estab-
lished); see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL INSURANCE OF PRIVATE
PENSION BENEFIS XV (1987) (asserting that the government's own rules, rather
than noncompliance by a plan sponsor, are often the source of a plan's un-
derfunding); see also RICMHARD A. IPpoiro, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSION INSUR-
ANCE (1989) (arguing that main cause of pension plan underfunding is coverage
of past service benefits).
Multiemployer pension plans may amortize contributions for one compo-
nent of vested benefits, past service benefits, over a 30 or 40 year period, de-
pending in part on the date the plan was established. See 29 U.S.C. § 1382(b)
(1988); Keating, supra note 16, at 809-10; CUMMINGS & KERSHAw, supra note
18, at A-2 to A-3. Because a multiemployer plan may amortize past service
benefits over several decades, a plan's unfunded vested benefits (and therefore
its withdrawal liability) may be very high during the early years of a plan.
Keating, supra note 16, at 811-12. Thus, a pension plan may be fully funded on
an "ongoing basis" but underfunded on a "termination basis." Id. at 812. In-
deed, because employers may amortize past service costs over a thirty year pe-
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the Seventh Circuit's interpretation tends to discourage em-
ployer participation in multiemployer plans, but provides no as-
surance that pension plans will recover enough assets to fund
vested employee benefits.
CONCLUSION
MPPAA's language and construction suggest that Congress
intended to create a distinction between "trades or businesses"
and investments for purposes of imposing controlled group with-
drawal liability. Such a distinction balances competing objec-
tives: it advances the overarching legislative intent of
safeguarding employees' retirement incomes by encouraging full
funding of employees' vested benefits without creating require-
ments so burdensome that employers refuse to participate in
guaranteed pension plans. Although Congress directed the
PBGC to promulgate regulations to implement MPPAA's con-
trolled group withdrawal provisions, attempting to fashion regu-
lations that define the elusive concept of "trades or businesses"
may prove to be of little use. As the district court observed in
Personnel, determining whether an activity constitutes a trade
or business is "essentially [a] factual determination." 13 7 Courts
should carefully examine the facts of the cases and draw the line
between "trades or businesses" and investments in such a way
that the choice of investments like real estate over other invest-
ment vehicles like stocks or bonds does not determine the impo-
sition of personal liability.
Central States v. Personnel, Inc. sets an unreasonably low
threshold of activity for a real estate trade or business. In draw-
ing the line between investments and "trades or businesses," the
courts should consider the principles governing the identifica-
tion of capital assets for capital gains purposes. Most impor-
tantly, the courts should clearly articulate factors that allow
individuals to determine on which side of the line their real es-
tate activities fall.
riod, a plan's past service liability will rarely be fully funded at the time of plan
termination. Id.
137. The district court observed that the courts have avoided "the applica-
tion of inflexible rules" to such determinations by holding that "whether an en-
tity may be termed a 'trade or business' is an essentially factual determination."
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Personnel, Inc.,
No. 90 C 1051, 1991 WL 104184, at *4 (N.D. IM. June 12, 1991).
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